McCormick Questions

Chapter 1:
McCormick argues that because the “ins-and-outers” have a wider range of perspectives, they have become dominant in the political sphere because of their unique ability to “see the big picture.” Are such political actors of greater importance than the careerists, or are they more like jacks of all trades and masters of none? (Sorry for the cliché.)

McCormick argues that “since World War II, the number of Americans having nil or minimalist interest in foreign affairs has significantly increased” and that even during the Vietnam-era voters were far less concerned with foreign policy as with domestic issues. Since 9-11 this trend has been changed to some degree (many polls suggested the war was the most important issue on Americans’ minds.) Is this change a reversal of the trend McCormick describes, or is it simply a temporary increase in foreign policy interest that will fade and continue the prior trend?

Chapter 2:
McCormick states the goal of U.S. foreign policy during and after WWI was “global pacification” and the establishment of a “Pax Americana.” Do you believe that this was the goal of American foreign policy, and if so, is that still the case today? How successful has America been in achieving this goal? If it is achievable, is it a goal worth achieving?

McCormick believes that the U.S. was actively working toward hegemony before and during WWII, and that in doing so it used the example set by the British Empire in using “limited means to meet unlimited ends.” Was hegemony always the goal for American foreign policy makers? How and to what extent did American strategy mirror that of the British Empire?

Chapter 3:
McCormick argues that, throughout its history, Russian foreign policy has been torn by contradictory impulses toward isolation and integration with the world. Could the same be said about Americans, or have we always been working toward greater integration with only fleeting thoughts of isolation?

In reference to America’s ability to counter threats from the left, right, and Russia, McCormick says that “Anything was possible if the government and its foreign policy had the public’s blessing of legitimacy. Nothing was possible without it.” Do you think this is an exaggeration of the importance of public approval, or is foreign policy completely impotent if the public sees it as legitimate?

Chapter 4:
McCormick suggests that the Truman Doctrine was essentially a globalization of the Monroe doctrine, America declaring its hegemony, not only in the Americas, but also across the globe. Was this the aim of the Truman doctrine, and if so, how could this be justified among the allies of the US (who were also opposed to the Monroe Doctrine)?

Selling the Marshall Plan domestically required mobilization of its potential supporters as well as disarmament of its potential opponents. Were did the government find support for the plan and what strategies were employed to assure them of the plan’s necessity?

Chapter 5:
How did some countries during the Cold War employ a policy of neutralism, and for what reasons did they do this? What benefits/costs were involved as opposed to a policy of integrationism?

For what reasons did the U.S. choose to intervene in the Suez and Hungarian Crises? Was America’s position of anti-colonialism and self-determination in the Third World consistent with its overall actions and policies, or was it simply a means to an end?

Chapter 6:
What lessons did the United States take from the Cuban Missile Crisis? Was the resulting shift in policy beneficial or not, and why?

McCormick describes Johnson’s shift in foreign policy regarding revolutions in the Western Hemisphere. He moved from Wilson’s distinction between “good revolutions” and “bad revolutions” to a position that “the only good revolution is a dead revolution.” In what ways has this policy changed and/or remained the same? What has been the effect of stick to the devil we know rather than allowing uncertai